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Abstract: 
 
Australia and Japan have frequently had difficult relationships with their neighbours. 
This paper suggests that when seen in their specific historical contexts, the fact that 
Australia and Japan have become ‘Asia’s odd men out’ is unsurprising. The central 
argument of this paper is that the consolidation and institutionalisation of regions is in 
large part a political exercise that reflects, and is informed by, discrete national 
conversations. Until and unless such national discourses align with wider 
transnational developments, regional processes are unlikely to prosper. An 
examination of Japan’s and Australia’s respective attempts to engage with and define 
their region reveals just how problematic this process can be.  
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Despite [its] economic connections, the Australian Asian ploy appears unlikely to meet 
any of the requirements for success for a civilisation shift by a torn country (Huntington 
1996: 152)  
 
Many Asians view Japan not only as nationally selfish but also overly imitative of the 
West and reluctant to join them in questioning the West's views on human rights and on 
the importance of individualism. This Japan is perceived as not truly Asian by many 
Asians, even as the West occasionally wonders to what degree Japan has truly become 
Western (Brzezinski  1997: 176-67). 
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Introduction 
 
Australia and Japan have frequently had difficult relations with their neighbours. 
Whether this is measured by Australia’s often frustrated attempts to gain entry to new 
regional forums, or Japan’s notoriously difficult relationships with China and Korea, 
both countries suffer from problems of acceptance and identity. In Australia’s case, 
other countries in East Asia —notably Malaysia—have questioned whether it is a 
‘genuine’ member of the region. While Japan is unambiguously ‘of’ East Asia, its 
leadership ambitions and good relations with the region have been undermined by its 
inability to come to terms with its historical role in the region.  Such issues have made 
the day-to-day conduct of relations in the region problematic for both countries, and 
raised fundamental questions about national identity and the enduring impact of each 
nation’s history. In both countries the question of where each ‘belongs’, and to which 
other countries they should be most closely aligned, continue to be central parts of 
their respective national policy debates.  
 
In this context, it is significant and revealing that Japan and Australia were the prime 
movers behind the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, an 
organisation that was explicitly designed to tackle narrowly conceived economic 
issues. APEC’s diverse membership —which included both countries’ key ally, the 
United States—was drawn from the broadly conceived ‘Asia-Pacific’ region. It might 
have been expected that APEC’s broad membership and technocratic agenda might 
have diluted issues of regional identity and allowed both countries to play an active, 
unproblematic role in regional affairs while maintaining crucial, ‘external’ 
relationships. However, APEC’s declining importance and visibility suggests that 
both its agenda and its identity have failed to resonate with many members. The 
emergence and apparent consolidation of ‘ASEAN+3’, a regional grouping predicated 
on the notion of an East Asian, rather than an Asia-Pacific identity, by contrast, 
appears to be gaining increased momentum. If it continues to do so, it will provide a 
major challenge for both Australia and Japan and their foreign policy priorities.  
 
The central argument of this paper is that the consolidation and institutionalisation of 
regions and regional identities is essentially a political exercise that reflects, and is 
informed by, discrete national conversations about foreign policy and national 
identity. Unless such national discourses align with wider transnational developments, 
however, regional processes are unlikely to prosper. An examination of Japan’s and 
Australia’s respective attempts to engage with and define their region reveals just how 
problematic this process can be. Consequently, we initially provide a brief theoretical 
introduction which spells out why regions — and the definition of regions — are 
potentially important, before looking in more detail at the experiences of Japan and 
Australia. These countries are especially important and illuminating, we suggest, 
because of their historically problematic relationships with East Asia. Their ability to 
reconcile the tensions between strategic obligations, economic imperatives and 
cultural preferences will be the defining test of their own capacity to be effective 
regional cit izens, and of the success of the East Asian regional project more generally. 
 
The Significance of Regions  
 
Regions have become important parts of both the theoretical and practical dimensions 
of international relations. There have been a number of ‘waves’ of scholarly interest 
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in regional processes in the post-war period, especially as a consequence of the rise of 
the European Union (EU) (Mansfield and Milner 1999). This has been replicated at a 
policy level, as governments around the world have become conscious of the potential 
advantages that regionally-based modes of cooperation might generate (Fawcett 
2004). The successful realisation of the EU project, its recent travails notwithstanding, 
has provided a powerful exemplar for other parts of the world and a  direct spur to 
further regional cooperation: countries elsewhere have been rightly concerned that 
they might be at a disadvantage relative to regionally integrated competitors, or 
excluded from the increasingly pervasive economic groupings that have consolidated 
over the last few decades. In short, despite all the — frequently imprecise — talk 
about ‘globalisation’, regions look like they are here to stay. Indeed, regional 
cooperation may offer a way for individual states to respond more effectively and 
proactively to both the challenges posed by intensifying international economic 
competition (Oman 1994), and to the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold War era 
(Buzan and Waever 2003). The only real question seems to be what form they will 
take and what forces are likely to shape them. To understand the constraints and 
opportunities that potentially face Japan and Australia, it is useful to revisit briefly 
some of the theoretical literature in this area. 
 
There are a number of basic distinctions that can be made about the way regions are 
conceived and about the dynamics that encourage their realisation in different parts of 
the world. Most fundamentally, perhaps, it is increasingly commonplace to 
distinguish between regionalism and regionalisation. Regionalism is primarily 
associated with self-consciously undertaken political efforts to create regional 
institutions and place cooperation on an increasingly formal basis. This is invariably 
accompanied by what Hettne and Soderbaum (2002: 34) describe as the ‘ideology of 
regionalism’, or the discursive justification of the regional project. Regionalisation, by 
contrast, is taken to refer to the empirical manifestation of trans-border economic  
integration and is principally driven by the private sector. For both Australia and 
Japan regionalisation has never been a problem. On the contrary, it is what has 
compelled greater cooperation with and attention to the region. But the precise 
political form this has taken —regionalism—has always been much more fraught and 
problematic. 
 
Despite the underlying structural basis for regional development provided by 
economic linkages or sheer geographical contingency, Japan and Australia have found 
it difficult to embrace the apparent advantages of regionalisation. There are, as 
Andrew Hurrell (1995: 38) points out, no ‘natural’ regions: ‘. . . it is how political 
actors perceive and interpret the idea of a region and notions of “regioness” that is 
critical: all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested’. The 
created and politically-contested nature of regions has been at the heart of Australia’s 
and Japan’s difficulties in coming to terms with East Asia. In this regard, Western 
Europe, has some major advantages: broadly similar political practices, leve ls of 
economic development and similar cultural traditions facilitated the transition to an 
increasingly coherent regional political community in the post war period. Even more 
importantly,  the United States used its economic, political and strategic leve rage to 
encourage greater European integration in a way it did not in the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region 
(Beeson 2005; Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Consequently, it made the very idea 
of a readily- identifiable, more or less coherent region like Western Europe’s much 
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less likely in either ‘East Asia’ or the much more broadly conceived Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 
This brief outline of the more important ways of conceptualising regional processes 
suggests a number of possibilities. First, regional cooperation offers potential benefits 
to states and businesses in an increasingly competitive international environment. 
Consequently, we are likely to see a continuing — possibly growing — interest in 
regionally-based projects. Second, the definition of regions is crucial, but far from 
self-evident. The increased use of the term ‘East Asia’ and the comparative decline of 
the ‘Asia-Pacific’ provides a telling illustration of what a fluid, open-ended and 
ultimately political process regional definition can be (Beeson 2006). The enormous 
potential political and economic diversity of the Asia-Pacific, to say nothing of its 
vast, imprecise geographical scope, meant that it was always going to be difficult to 
provide the requisite ‘idea of region’, that has become such an important part of the 
effective realisation of regional forms (Breslin and Higgott 2000: 335). As we shall 
see, both Australia and Japan invested a good deal of political capital in trying to 
promote the Asia-Pacific idea and now find themselves scrambling to come to terms 
with an emerging regional order that is coalescing around ‘ASEAN+3’, rather than 
the APEC forum they so assiduously promoted. These organisations have come to 
epitomise the wider fates of the East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions, and the 
difficulties Australian and Japanese policy-makers have faced as a consequence. 
Simply put, it has proved very difficult for both countries to reconcile their underlying 
economic relations with their political and strategic relations. As a consequence of a 
revealing mixture of domestic and external imperatives, they remain Asia’s odd men 
out.  
 
Australia: Alienation, Alliance, and Engagement 
 
One of the most important prerequisites for the realisation of any wider regional 
project is the inculcation of a more widely based sense of regional identity and its 
acceptance at a national level. In both Australia and Japan, and arguably in East Asia 
more generally, the correspondence between national and regional projects has been 
limited  (He 2004). To understand why relations with East Asia have been so 
problematic for Australia, it is necessary to sketch the evolving historical and 
geopolitical context in which they are embedded. 
 
The weight of history 
 
One of the most important potential bases for regional development is brute 
geography. It is no coincidence that most regional groupings occur between adjacent 
countries. Neighbours are more likely to have historically established trade relations 
that make political cooperation more attractive. It is precisely this sort of pragmatic 
response to contingency that gave much early theorising about regions a distinctly 
‘functionalist’ flavour (Haas 1964). Clearly,  regionalisation does provide a 
potentially powerful spur to regionalism, a possibility that has been apparent in 
Japan’s more active participation in ASEAN+3, and the emerging consensus that 
some sort of regional forum was necessary to tackle distinctively regional problems 
(Terada 2003). In Australia’s case, however, while economic regionalisation has 
provided a major impetus for political engagement with the region over the last few 
decades, this has not always been so. On the contrary, for much of Australia’s history 
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a combination of imperial economic structures and hegemonic strategic relations have 
made authentic ‘engagement’ with its northern neighbours problematic if not 
impossible. 
 
As a former British colony Australia’s trade relations were skewed toward Europe. 
Indeed, it was not until 1966 that Japan finally replaced Britain as Australia’s major 
trade partner (Pinkstone 1992: 183). Coincidently, it also marked the beginning of the 
end of the ‘White Australia policy’, in which successive Australian governments had, 
since formal independence from Britain in 1901, excluded some potential migrants on 
the basis of race. Although these events were not directly related, they were 
emblematic of a rapidly changing international economic and political order to which 
Australian policymakers were having to rapidly adjust: not only was East Asia’s 
increasingly rapid and widespread  industrialisation creating important new markets 
for Australian raw materials, but the changing international political climate meant 
that racist public policy was becoming unsustainable. In such circumstances, a 
combination of normative and pragmatic considerations provided the impetus for a 
major reorientation of Australian public policy. Despite the seemingly overwhelming 
economic and political imperatives, however, it was a highly contentious process and 
one that remains incomplete to this day. 
 
One of the key obstacles inhibiting a major economic and political reorientation 
toward East Asia and Australia’s rapidly growing economic partners, was Australia’s 
distinctive history. The sense of isolation and vulnerability this engendered in the 
minds of generations of Australian policymakers continues to influence strategic 
thinking (Burke 2001). That this should have been the case in the earlier phases of 
Australian history is unsurprising, perhaps: Australians considered themselves a long 
way from ‘home’, adjacent to a continent about which they knew little and generally 
cared less. Asia was uniformly seen as an immediate strategic danger and a more 
generalised threat to Australian living standards. Ironically, this latter idea has been 
completely overturned and East Asia is now seen as central to Australia’s continuing 
prosperity. East Asia’s potential  menace has not dissipated as far as strategic planners 
are concerned, however. The Second World War and the threat of invasion by Japan 
may have effectively ended Britain’s capacity to underwrite Australia’s security, but 
this only led Australian policymakers to cultivate a new ‘great and powerful friend’ in 
the United States. 
 
The US has remained the cornerstone of Australian security ever since, a relationship 
enshrined in the ANZUS Treaty, and regularly reinforced by Australian participation 
in wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The intention here is not to explore 
the merits of any of those conflicts — although it is worth noting that none of them 
posed a direct threat to Australia — but to highlight the difficulties that close strategic 
ties with first Britain and latterly the US have had on potential relations with East 
Asia. Clearly, direct involvement in regional conflicts precluded any possibility of 
closer ties with a number of regional powers and their ideological allies. It was not 
until the early 1970s, for example, that Australian relations with mainland China were 
finally normalised. Even then it would take the ending of the Cold War to reconfigure 
the wider geopolitical context in East Asia to a point where a genuinely region-wide 
form of Asian regionalism was finally possible in area that had been deeply divided 
by the Cold War. Despite this dramatic re-ordering of the international system, 
Australia’s strategic relations remained centred on the US rather than the region to its 
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north, something that has made deeper engagement with the region problematic, and 
led to a compartmentalising of Australian foreign policy as a consequence. 
 
Asian engagement and its aftermath 
 
Although there has been a good deal of retrospective debate in Australia about which 
side of politics — the Australian Labor Party (ALP) or the Liberal-National coalition 
— is primarily responsible for reorienting Australian foreign policy toward East Asia 
(Gurry 1995), the ALP has been responsible for the most tangible and important 
changes. The governments of Bob Hawke and his successor Paul Keating did more 
than any others to promote ‘Asian engagement’ — even if it was not always clear 
what this term might actually mean in practice. At one level, though, this was clearly 
a pragmatic response to the increasingly recognised economic importance of East 
Asia, a reality highlighted by Ross Garnaut’s (1989) influential, eponymous report 
prepared for the Hawke government. At another level, it marked a more fundamental 
attempt to re-position Australia as a bona fide part of the region to its north. At times 
these efforts became somewhat farcical. Former Foreign Minister Garreth Evans, for 
example,  literally tried to re-draw the map to include Australia as part of a putative 
‘East Asian hemisphere’ (Hiebert 1995). Nevertheless, the recognition that Australia’s 
economic and perhaps strategic future was intimately bound up with, and dependent 
upon, its northern neighbours saw one of the most intense and productive periods of 
Australian diplomacy. 
 
At the centre of this diplomatic effort was the creation of APEC. It is important to 
note that as originally conceived by Australia APEC was a trade grouping that offered 
a way of institutionalising and stabilising Australia’s relations with its East Asian 
trade partners and ensuring it was not locked out of any possible regional trade bloc. 
Consequently, it did not include the US. As such it was of little interest to Australia’s 
Asian neighbours who remained dependent on access to North American markets. As 
one of APEC’s other major sponsors, Japan represented a widespread desire for a 
mechanism that ensured continuing access to American markets (Funabashi 1995). 
Not only was Australia’s original vision significantly redrawn to suit East Asian 
preferences, as a result, but its modus operandi also reflected the sort of consensual, 
voluntarist approach that characterised the ASEAN grouping’s operations (Acharya 
1997). While this style of policy-making was not conducive to realising the sort of 
regional trade liberalisation APEC was primarily designed to promote, an even more 
fundamental problem revolved around the highly diverse nature of APEC’s 
membership. Not only was the US included, but so were a number of Latin American 
nations and eventually even Russia1 — something that completely undermined the 
idea that APEC represented a coherent regional identity or project, and which helps to 
explain its subsequent demise (Ravenhill 2001). 
 
At the same time that Paul Keating in particular was becoming preoccupied with 
promoting closer ties with the region, a domestic debate was unfolding between 
supporters and opponents of close ties with the region. On the one hand were those 
who argued that Australia’s future lay with East Asia, and who advocated much closer 
ties and greater ‘Asia literacy’ as a consequence (Fitzgerald 1997). On the other were, 
high profile critics who claimed that Australia was being ‘swamped’ by Asians, and 
who were concerned about the nature of Australian identity and values as a 
consequence. At its most virulent, this tendency culminated in the rise of Pauline 
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Hanson’s One Nation Party, which promoted a barely coherent amalgam of 
protectionist economics and racial exclusivity, but which achieved remarkable — if 
short- lived — prominence (see Leach et al 2000). One Nation prospered on the back 
of a widespread rejection of everything Keating and the ALP stood for – something 
that contributed to the demise of the Keating government and its replacement by John 
Howard’s coalition government. Significantly, the current Prime Minister, John 
Howard unapologetically campaigned on domestic issues and explicitly rejected the 
‘big picture’ of Asian engagement that Keating had championed (Williams 1997). The 
key point to emphasise here is that a debate about Australia’s place in the region and 
the nature of its relationship with East Asia led to a major transformation of domestic 
politics and a repudia tion of the idea that Australia’s future was inextricably 
dependent on, or ought to privilege, ties with Asia — an idea the crisis of 1997 helped 
to confirm. 
 
The Howard era 
 
 In this transformed international and domestic environment, the Howard government 
was able promote a new style of foreign policy. A number of aspects of the Howard 
government’s approach merit emphasis as they highlight just how complex balancing 
Australia’s relations with the region and other key allies has proved to be. First and 
most importantly, perhaps, from the outset Howard was intent on ‘reinvigorating’ the 
relationship with the US, which he claimed had been neglected in favour of links with 
Asia (Beeson 2003). While the degree of neglect of Australia-US relations might have 
been overstated,2 the recalibration of Australian foreign policy gelled with a second 
aspect of Howard’s foreign policy: an emphasis on bilateralism rather than 
multilateralism. Not only did this new approach lead to a further downgrading of 
APEC as a consequence, but it would ultimately be replicated within the US itself. 
The election of George W Bush and the US’s own post-S11 policy overhaul has seen 
the most powerful country in the world display a similar scepticism about 
multilateralism, and a preference for bilateral or even unilateral policy as a 
consequence (Daadler and Lindsay 2003). The difference between the US and 
Australia, of course, is that the US has the political, economic  and strategic leverage 
to make such a strategy feasible — whatever its impact on the overall international 
system may be. 
 
However, the intention here is not to explore the merits of multilateralism versus 
bilateralism, but to consider policy in relation to regionalism. In this context a couple 
of further points are worth making. First, Howard has been at pains to emphasise that 
just because Australia is geographically adjacent to Asia, this does not mean that it 
should choose to downgrade ties with other non-Asian countries as a consequence. 
Indeed, on Howard’s (1996) first overseas trip after winning office he declared to a 
somewhat bemused Indonesian audience that ‘We [Australians] do not claim to be 
Asian . . . I do not believe that Australia faces a choice between our history and our 
geography’. This is especially true of the US which, from Howard’s perspective is 
especially crucial as a guarantor of Australian security. Equally significantly, 
Howard’s (2004: 7) high profile identification with, and championing of, the US 
relationship is predicated on what he considers the ‘shared values and common 
interests’ that bind the two countries together.  
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The idea that close ties between nations can only be achieved on the basis of shared 
values has become a feature of the Howard government’s foreign policy. Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer’s (2000) claim that Australia could never be culturally 
integrated into the Asian region suggested that the Howard government had little 
enthusiasm for becoming more intimately connected to the region or part of any 
putative regional identity. On the contrary, the Howard government has developed an 
approach Howard describes as ‘positive realism’, which is an essentially pragmatic 
foreign policy response driven by the need to deal with neighbours like China, which 
are economically and strategically of central  importance to Australia’s future, but 
which subscribe to values that are so alien as to preclude the sort of close ties that 
characterise relations with the US and Britain (Wesley 2005). It is an approach that 
has inherent tensions and which may make Australia’s future relations with the region 
problematic. 
 
The increasing interest in, and potential importance of, ASEAN+3 has highlighted 
Australia’s marginal place in East Asia’s emergent institutional architecture. 
Belatedly the Howard government has recognised the potential importance of such 
developments and succeeded in getting an invitation to the East Asian Summit — but 
not before it was obliged to abandon its opposition to signing ASEAN’s Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (Kelly 2005) . While this has been portrayed as a relatively 
insignificant incident by the Howard government, it reveals a potentially 
irreconcilable tension at the heart of its policy toward East Asia: Australian 
policymakers are reluctant to commit fully to regional bodies that may compromise 
strategic ties with the US, and the obligations this has traditionally implied. Not only 
has this fundamental, non-negotiable allegiance with the US led to a series of ill-
judged comments by Howard about Australia’s ‘deputy sheriff’ role in the region and 
his preparedness to mimic US policy and contemplate pre-emptive strikes in 
Southeast Asia (Fickling 2002), but it continues to make the nature of Australia’s 
Asian engagement uncertain, partial and politically contentious. In such 
circumstances, the prospects for achieving insider status as an authentic part of the 
region’s institutional and political activities remain uncertain. 
 
Japan: History, Identity and Unfulfilled Expectations  
 
Given Japan’s economic importance to East Asia and the fact that it is unambiguously 
‘of’ the region —geographically, at least—in an way Australia is not, its uncertain 
position is surprising. Yet Japan’s problematic relationship with Asia is long-standing, 
overlaid with conflict, and contains major tensions between its political and economic 
elements. Many of these issues have their roots in Japan’s identity problems, which 
began with the Meiji Restoration, when Datsu-A nyu-O (“get out of Asia into 
Europe”) became one of the major slogans of the era. This objective was realised —
albeit it an unexpected manner—with Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905. Subsequently, Japan directed its military ambitions towards its neighbours, in a 
process that culminated in the Second World War. The occupation of Korea, the 
conflict with China and the invasion of Southeast Asia may have occurred generations 
ago, but they continue to affect relations to this day. Japan’s occasionally ‘insensitive’ 
behaviour frequently alienates its neighbours and makes good relations inherently 
problematic. 
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This is not necessarily for a want of effort on Japan’s part, however. After the war, 
Japan sought to reintegrate into Asia through the payment of reparations to Southeast 
Asia. Tokyo also attempted to take the initiative regionally by proposing the 
establishment of several institutions for Asia. When Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi 
visited Southeast Asia in 1957, he proposed an idea of establishing an Asian 
Development Fund, an idea that did not materialise mainly due to the lack of the US 
and Asian support (Sudo 1992: 45-46). Japan also took the lead in establishing the 
Asian Development Bank in 1966, and in hosting the first Southeast Asian Ministerial 
Conference for Development in Tokyo in 1966. But Tokyo was unable to secure the 
ADB headquarters (Wan 2001: 152-53), and the Development conference was not 
held after 1975. Thus, despite its best efforts, Japan’s attempts at regional leadership 
were not supported by Asian countries.  
 
From the 1960s onwards, Japan put emphasis on regional cohesion under the ‘Asia-
Pacific’ framework. Concrete institutions were launched at the private sector level in 
collaboration with Australia to promote the Asia-Pacific idea.3 Japan’s attempts to 
shape the region and its identity were manifest in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry’s (METI) efforts to pursue the Asia Pacific Cooperation concept, which 
culminated in the creation of the APEC. METI aimed to achieve two strategic goals 
through APEC. The first was to respond to new trends in US trade policy. In the late 
1980s, the US government intensified unilateral and North America-oriented trade 
policies. METI hoped to enmesh the US in a regionally-based multilateral framework 
in order to reduce the effects of these policies. The second was to promote a shift 
from ‘development relying on the United States’ to ‘development based on the 
division of roles according to each country’s economic capability’ (Yamakage 1997: 
229). APEC was to be the vehicle to promote the alignment of economic development 
and economic interdependence in the framework of the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, 
the foundation of APEC was potentially a seminal achievement of identity creation 
for Japan, a ‘liminal nation’ that had not become a core member of any regional 
groups and had an anxiety about unstable identity (Oba 2004). APEC was a place 
where Japan could play a distinctive role through Asia Pacific diplomacy that 
combined Japan’s position as a member of the western group and a nation in Asia.   
 
When moves to develop a new East Asian grouping began in the early 1990s, Japan 
stayed aloof and continued to support the Asia-Pacific model. When Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir proposed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) concept in 
1991, Mahathir expected that Japan would take the lead in its development.4  But, the 
Japanese government did not support the concept. At a press conference at the 
ASEAN-PMC in August 1995, a senior MOFA official declared that Tokyo ‘firmly 
believes that the EAEC should be launched with the blessings of all APEC countries. 
Any attempt to divide APEC countries should be avoided’ (Leong 1999: 16). 
Consequently, despite the fact that the ASEAN economic ministers invited China, 
Japan and South Korea to an informal meeting in April 1995, the Japanese 
government continued to push for the participation of Australia and New Zealand, 
with the result that this expanded economic ministers meeting eventually did not take 
place (Yamakage 2003: 22). 
 
The Asian financial crisis and the reorientation of ‘Asia’ 
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A critical incident that influenced Japan’s stance on Asia was the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-98. The Japanese government provided huge financial support for 
crisis-hit countries,5 but its efforts to play a decisive leadership role were frustrated by 
US and IMF opposition. More recently, however, various government agencies have 
positively committed to the formation of regional mechanisms designed to foster 
closer cooperation under the ASEAN Plus Three Framework. In this regard, Japan has 
been deeply involved in the development of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and 
relevant financial architectures in East Asia.6 The CMI was the first achievement of 
APT cooperation and has developed substantial institutional frameworks. Although it 
was unclear who took the lead in creating the CMI, Tokyo played a decisive role 
behind the scenes. Japan had already concluded bilateral swap agreements with South 
Korea and Malaysia as a part of the New Miyazawa Initiative, and proposed to 
expand and combine agreements among East Asian countries (Kishimoto 2001: 305). 
Significantly, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) undertook informal 
negotiations to gain explicit support from the United States.  
 
While the US government adamantly opposed the Asian Monetary Fund in autumn 
1997, it did not object to the CMI. This was partly because Washington recognised 
the need for regional facilities as measures to prevent the recurrence of the disruptive 
1997 financial crisis, and partly because the CMI was not a threat to International 
Monetary Fund’s authority or preferred practices (Henning 2002: 61). However, the 
MOF must take some of the credit, too, as it successfully lobbied Washington about 
its merits,7 and has subsequently made efforts to create feasible surveillance 
mechanisms in East Asia. When the APT finance ministers agreed to exchange data 
on capital flows bilaterally in May 2001, Japan concluded an agreement for this 
objective with five countries (Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam). In order to facilitate this process, the MOF established the Japan-ASEAN 
Financial Technical Assistance Fund at the ASEAN Secretariat in September 2001. 
The fund aimed to assist ASEAN members to improve their monitoring, collection 
and reporting systems on capital flows. The MOF sent its bureaucrats and other 
specialists in finance to several Southeast Asian countries under the New Miyazawa 
Initiative.  
 
METI’s policy reorientation towards East Asia was also notable. METI took the lead 
in shifting Japan’s trade policy from multilateralism to bilateralism. In 1999, METI 
began internal discussions about new trade policy, and revealed its policy orientation 
in its 1999 White Paper (Munakata 2004). Afterward, METI made public ‘Japanese 
Policy to Strengthen Economic Partnership’, and has revised it every year.8 METI’s 
decisive commitment was a driving force in concluding an FTA with Singapore, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. What METI envisioned in the FTA policy was 
the formation of the East Asian business zones where common standards and rules in 
addition to tariff cuts would be institutionalised and help to expand business 
operations and improve industrial competitiveness (METI 2003).  
 
It is no coincidence that Japanese economic ministries took the lead in promoting 
cooperation programs with East Asia. Production networks that were formed in the 
early 1990s developed further through sophisticated division of labour in entire East 
Asia. Linkages through FDI contributed to the rise of trade, a large portion of which 
was conducted as intra- firm trade. East Asia as a group surpassed the US in overall 
trade in 1997, and China including Hong Kong surpassed the US as Japan’s primary 
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trade partner in 2004. The recovery from the decade- long recession was largely 
sustained by the ‘China boom’, which stimulated demands in various manufacturing 
products such as manufacturing and steel. These growing economic linkages, mixed 
with strong pressure from business associations, have left the economic ministries 
with little option other than to promote regional cooperation. 9  
 
Clearly, therefore, Japan ought to be well placed to become a major, effective and 
valued actor in East Asia’s emerging regional architecture. After all, it is still the 
largest economy in the region, a major source of aid and investment, and a potential 
source of economic and even strategic stability for the rest of the region. Yet despite 
efforts to promote regional cooperation in narrow functional issue-areas, Japan 
remains incapable of fulfilling its promise and exploiting its advantages. To 
understand why, we have to consider Japan’s sense of itself and the powerful 
undercurrents of national identity that continue to make regional relations problematic. 
 
Japan’s identity as an Asian nation 
 
Japanese foreign policy is characterised by some striking tensions that help to explain 
both Japan’s importance, but also its inability to play a major leadership role in the 
region or to establish close relations with many of its neighbours. On the one hand, 
Japan’s massive trade and investment has made it the principal engine of East Asian 
regionalisation for many years, an economic weight the Japanese government has 
tried to turn into political leverage and influence in the region with some success 
(Hatch and Yamamura 1995). On the other hand, however, processes of regionalism, 
or political attempts to institutionalise regional cooperation, are ultimately socially 
constructed; in this context Japan’s identity and history has made its integration with 
East Asia more problematic. The question of whether Japan belongs to ‘Asia’ or ‘the 
West’ is still unresolved.  
 
Some scholars argue that ‘the common cultural zone’ is emerging in East Asia 
(Shiraishi 2004: Aoki 2005), which ought to benefit Japan and enhance its ‘soft 
power’ in the region, 10 making closer ties more feasible. The zone has been formed as 
a consequence of the enhanced exchange of pop cultures and the advent of the urban 
middle class. The middle class in big cities in East Asia has adopted similar life styles 
and enjoyed common cultural products such as Hong Kong movies and Korean soap 
operas. The Japanese culture represented by J-pop, animation and comics has also 
contributed to the formation of the common cultural zone. Similarly, East Asian 
cultural booms, especially the so-called the hanryu boom (Korean wave), became a 
social phenomenon in Japan. 11 
 
Yet growing cultural linkages between Japan and Asia have equivocal influences on 
the Japanese people’s perception of Asia. A recent Japanese government survey 
revealed that the ratio of Japanese people that hold either some or strong feelings of 
warmth towards South Korea rose from 43.4 % in 1993 to 55.0 % in 2003 and 56.7 % 
in 2004. The high ratios in 2003 and 2004 corresponded with the hanryu boom in 
Japanese society. This rise was influenced by the hanryu boom in Japanese society. 
However, the corresponding figure for Southeast Asia remained almost unchanged 
(35.4 % in 1993 and 36.2 % in 2003), while that for China actually declined from 
53.8 % in 1993 and 47.9 % in 2003. But even the 2003 figure for South Korea was far 
below positive feelings about the US (75.8 %), and almost same level as that for 
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‘Australia and New Zealand’ (54.8 %). This implies that the Japanese people’s 
perception of its neighbouring countries has not improved significantly, while they 
still have strongly positive feelings about western countries in general and their 
security guarantor, the US, in particular.  
 
For a long time, Japanese political elites defined Japan’s role as a bridge between the 
West and Asia. As an underlying idea, Japanese policymakers portrayed Japan’s 
relationship with the rest of Asia in the context of ‘Japan and Asia’, not ‘Japan in 
Asia’. A recent comparative study of identity shows that the Japanese still consider 
themselves only as Japanese, with only a weak identity as ‘Asians’. 12 Not only is it 
apparent that Japanese people have yet to develop a broader sense of Asian identity 
that might underpin closer ties with the region, but it becomes easier to understand 
why narrowly conceived national issues remain so important and enjoy so much 
domestic support despite the obvious damage this does to Japan’s international 
position. 
 
Historical legacies and the alliance 
 
The intersection of national and international issues, and the impossibility of keeping 
them separate in the contemporary era, is clearly evident in the Japan’s continuing 
struggles to come to terms with the historical legacy of its war record. Two issues are 
especially contentious in this context: the glossing over of Japan’s war-time record in 
history textbooks and Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine — both of 
which have attracted increasingly heated criticism from South Korea and China. For a 
while in the late 1990s, these criticisms had actually diminished: the Japan-Korea 
Joint Declaration in October 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi acknowledged the fact that 
historically Japan had caused tremendous damage and suffering to the Koran people 
through its colonial rule, and expressed his ‘deep remorse’ and ‘heartfelt apologies’ 
for this fact. At the same time, the declaration proclaimed that Japan and South Korea 
were building a relationship of trust and mutual understanding, and looking towards 
the next century. Likewise, in making a formal visit to Japan in October 2000, 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji stated that ‘the Chinese side has no intention of 
provoking the Japanese people over historical issues. It is important that the Japanese 
side also must not forget that phase of history’. There is evidence that Japan is 
gradually addressing the issue of its history of aggression to its neighbouring 
countries. This was typically shown in the controversy over school history textbooks. 
In 2001, Ministry of Education gave official approval to a controversial history 
textbook of a right-leaning publisher, but various civil groups organised opposition to 
the adoption of this textbook, and the eventual ratio of adoption was a minuscule 
0.039 % in the whole junior high school. 
 
Despite this, the Koizumi administration that began in 2001 reversed much of the 
progress that had been made in improving relations with Korea and China. When 
Koizumi first visited Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001, China’s and Korea’s responses 
were relatively muted. Koizumi even made a one-day visit to China and South Korea 
respectively in October in order to try and improve relations with its two neighbours. 
Chinese Premier Zhu stated at a trilateral summit the following month that Japan’s 
relations with the two countries were becoming frank due to Koizumi’s initiatives to 
improve them. 13 However, despite this apparent good will, relations have deteriorated 
dramatically of late following repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Koizumi (April 
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2002, January 2003, January 2004, and October 2005). Given the strength of national 
feeling about these issues in both Korea and China their reactions have been 
unsurprisingly hostile. It is indicative of how much relations between Japan and its 
neighbours have soured that, although the leaders of Japan and China have had 
meetings on the sidelines of international conferences, there have been no direct 
meetings since Koizumi’s visit to China in October 2001.  
 
Japan’s position in this context is remarkable when compared to Australia’s. Australia, 
it needs to be remembered, has been involved in every major conflict in East Asia 
since the Second World War, and yet it has not faced criticism of its military record in 
Asian. This differential treatment is a consequence of Japan failing to confront its 
historical role, the conventional wisdom has it, (Wang 2002: 126), but it is also clear 
that China in particular has skilfully exploited Japan’s discomfort for its own 
purposes.14 The reason Japan has found it so difficult to resolve this issue despite the 
political damage it has caused it is because domestic attitudes have been deeply 
rooted parts of national identity since the Meiji era. While the Japanese admit that the 
Pacific War was a mistake and that they were guilty of causing great suffering in the 
region, they still have ambivalent feelings about the war. Modern history since the 
Meiji restoration has seen Japan successfully achieve western-style modernisation 
while simultaneously keeping a distinct national identity. Consequently, and despite 
the fact that this process finally led to a disastrous war, many Japanese find it difficult 
to renounce some of the positive aspects of the earlier period as it would be 
tantamount to denying the national identity (Inoguchi 2004: 33-35).  
 
In many ways, therefore, this historical legacy is a uniquely Japanese problem, but in 
other regards Japan faces similar dilemmas to Australia when it comes to establishing 
foreign policy priorities and relations with the region. Japan’s relationship with the 
US has, like Australia’s, been the central pillar of Japan’s postwar international 
relations and security. In Japan’s case, though, the US-Japan alliance was ‘political’ 
first and strategic second.15 Because of its overall importance in Japan’s foreign and 
domestic policies, the end of the Cold War did not lead to the termination of a 
security treaty whose prime objective was to defend Japan from the communist threat. 
Tokyo and Washington sought to redefine their security relations. The new National 
Defence Program Outline, formulated in November 1995, reaffirmed the centrality of 
the Japan-US Security Treaty to Japan’s security policy (Sakanaka 1997; Muroyama 
1997). The completion of such attempts was the enactment of the ‘Law on 
Emergencies around Japan’ in 1999. 
 
Thus, the bilateral relationship with the US has become the centrepiece of Japan’s 
foreign policies and a potential constraint on other relationships. Even after the 
Japanese government intensified Asia-oriented policies in the late 1990s, its 
diplomatic posture continued to oscillate between Asia and the US. In the new 
millennium, Japan’s MOFA has launched several initiatives designed to enhance 
linkages and cooperation with East Asia. However, most of them were vague and 
indecisive, reflecting the continuing centrality of the alliance with the US and the 
reluctance of Japanese officials to jeopardise it. For example, when Prime Minister 
Koizumi made a formal visit to Southeast Asia in January 2002, he proposed the ‘East 
Asian Community’ concept. But what was most significant about this vaguely defined 
proposal, perhaps, was that it contained Australia and New Zealand: the inclusion of 
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Australia and New Zealand was designed to assuage American concerns about the 
possible emergence of exclusionary East Asian countries groupings. 
 
The same sort of contradictory dynamics could be seen when the APT summit was 
held in Bali in October 2003. The ASEAN members encouraged China and Japan to 
accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the grouping’s framework for 
peace and stability adopted at the first ASEAN summit in 1976. Five out of the ten 
ASEAN leaders strongly urged Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to join the TAC at 
the summit.16 While China acceded to the treaty at the summit, like Australia, Japan 
was far more ambivalent and non-committal as a consequence of considerations 
about, and commitment to, the US-Japan alliance and American sensitivities. 
Eventually, Koizumi signed a document expressing Japan’s intention of joining the 
TAC at the Japan-ASEAN summit two months later. At this summit, Japan and 
ASEAN issued the Tokyo Declaration that referred to the East Asian Community. Yet, 
the declaration did not define the scope of the proposed East Asian Community. 
Japan’s stance continued to reflect US concerns about possible participants, and when 
an informal APT Foreign Ministers meeting was held in May 2005, Japanese Foreign 
Minister Machimura suggested that the US be invited as an observer. As far as Japan 
was concerned, its bilateral the US continued to constrain the development of more 
independent relationship with the region. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Both Australia and Japan have had difficulty in establishing themselves as authentic 
and effective members of an emerging East Asian community. In Australia’s case, 
this is not entirely surprising: although the definition and scope of regions is 
inherently artificial, some are more ‘natural’ or likely than others. The members of the 
ASEAN+3 grouping reflect a number of common East Asian historical experiences 
and patterns of development which, while still diverse, display a good deal more 
commonalities than the more expansive Asia-Pacific region does (Beeson 2006; 
Stubbs 2002). Indeed, the momentum that has developed behind these two visions of 
regional order accounts for their relative success and the growing consensus that East 
Asian regionalism is an idea whose time has come. Australia’s ‘outsider’ status in this 
context may have been a consequence of brute geography, but it has been 
compounded by a number of historical, political and strategic factors that have made 
close ties with East Asia more problematic: generations of policymakers have tended 
to identify with, and align themselves to, extra-regional forces. In such circumstances, 
ties with ‘Asia’ have often assumed a slightly awkward and instrumental quality. 
 
Japan’s awkwardness is more surprising. Japan’s economic weight and the powerful 
role it has played as a force of regiona lisation, should have made it a powerful force 
for, and actor in, processes of regionalism. That it has not been able to play such a role 
must be attributed to its own inability to come to terms with its problematic historical 
legacy, and the constraining nature of the ties that historical legacy has generated. On 
the one hand, relations with key neighbours remain poisoned by war-time grievances 
and resentments. On the other hand, Japan’s continuing ties to the US mean that —as 
in Australia’s case—close relations with the region are made more difficult because of 
the desire not to jeopardise relations with its ‘great and powerful friend’. It is striking 
that the one area in which Japan has been able to play an effective role has been in 
monetary cooperation — an arena in which its economic power and technocratic 
 16 
competence may prove decisive, and where questions of identity and history are less 
likely to intrude. 
 
If a distinctly East Asian form of regionalism continues to gain momentum both 
countries will face difficult challenges. At best, this will involve skilful diplomacy 
and finessing relations with East Asia on the one hand and the US on the other.17 At 
worst, the emergence of a more politically coherent East Asia —especially one that is 
increasingly China-centric and less dependent on a declining American hegemon—
may force a painful and contentious recalibration of national priorities and allegiances 
that is more in keeping with economic realities. Somewhat ironically, therefore, 
regionalisation my ultimately come to define Japan’s and Australia’s orientation to 
processes of regionalism as both countries are forced to come to terms with a region 
in which they mat not feel comfortable, but which they cannot do without. 
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1 Russia was included in APEC at the insis tence of the US which was this as useful leverage in 
encouraging Russia’s acceptance of NATO’s eastward expansion, and which was indicative of the lack 
of importance the US attached to APEC – despite its significant to its two key ‘Asia-Pacific’ allies, 
Australia and Japan. Keating described the US’s behaviour as ‘an act of economic vandalism’. See 
Keating (1998). 
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2 Bipartisan support of close ties, especially strategic ones, has been a non-negotiable staple of policy 
for both the ALP and colation parties. The current leader of the ALP, Kim Beasley, is one of the US’s 
strongest supporters in Australia. 
3 Foreign Minister Takeo Miki referred to the ‘Asia-Pacific Diplomacy’ idea in 1967, and Prime 
Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed the ‘Pacific Basin Cooperation’ concept in 1980. The major 
private driven institutions are the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967, the Pacific Trade 
and Development Conference (PAFTAD) in 1968, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC) in 1980. 
4 The EAEC was to comprise the ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, and China, excluding 
Australia and New Zealand as well as the United States. 
5 In October 1998, Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced the New Miyazawa Initiative. The 
initiative aimed to provide packages of support measures totalling US$30 billion, of which US$15 
billion would be made available for the mid- to and long-term development while another US$15 
billion would be used for the short-term capital need during the process of implementing economic 
reform. The total amount that the Japanese government provided for assistance reached US$80 billion, 
US$70 billion of which was implemented by December 1999 (MOFA 2000). 
6 At the second APT finance ministers meeting in May 2000, finance ministers announced the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI). The initiative aimed to provide liquidity support to member countries that would 
face short-run balance of payment deficits, through an extension of the existing ASEAN swap 
arrangements and the development of a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) that included 
Japan, China and South Korea. 
7 A senior MOF official recalls that it was tough to convince Washington that the initiative would be 
completely different from the AMF (Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun, 12 May 2000: Asahi Shimbun, 24 May 
2000). 
8METI, “External Economic Policy,” [Online, cited 17 March 2005]. Available from  
<http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/index_externaleconomicpolicy.html> 
9 Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) called that the East Asian Free Economic Zone should 
be formed by 2015 under joint leadership by Japan and China (Keidanren 2005). 
10 ‘Soft power’ refers to nation’s  ideational and cultural influences that ‘coopt rather than coerce’, and 
which can be significant in allowing it to shape the international order and the behaviour of others. 
Given Japan’s repudiation of offensive military power, this sort of influence becomes even more 
important. See Nye (2002: 8-12). 
11 Hanryu means fad for all things South Korean, urged by popular Korean movies, dramas, and pop 
music. In particular, ‘Winter Sonata’ romantic television drama of Bae Yong Joon provoked the 
‘Yong-sama’ boom among Japanese women. 
12 A comparative study of identity in 18 East Asian nations in 2000 revealed that although most East 
Asians continued to define their identity primarily on the basis of nation, religion or race, their views of 
transnational sources of identity were more expansive than Japan’s. When asked if they felt part of a 
supranational group, and given the choice of ‘Asian,’ ‘Chinese,’ ‘Islamic,’ ‘Other supranational 
identity,’ or ‘Do not think of myself in this way’, South Koreans, Thais and Filipinos were positively 
‘Asians’, registering 88.6%, 81.9% and 75.1% , respectively. As for the Japanese, 26.4 % selected 
‘Asian’ and 70.9 % chose the last category, refusing to think themselves in any supranational fashion 
(Inoguchi 2002: 269). 
13 Japan Times, November 6, 2001. 
14 Chinese authorities appear to have used anti-Japanese sentiment to undermine Japan’s attempts to 
secure a UN seat, for example. See ‘UN power play drives China protests’, International Herald 
Tribune, April 12, 2005. 
15 From the perspective of the US, of course, Japan’s significance was primarily strategic as a bulwark 
against Soviet expansionism in Asia. See Schaller (1982). 
16 Asahi Shimbun, 11 December 2003: 19 November 2003.  
17 At the time of writing Australia, Japan and the US have established a three-way security forum that 
excludes China and appears intended to counter the latter’s growing influence in East Asia. See ‘China 
snubbed as Australia, Japan, US discuss security’, Sydney Morning Herald, January 6. 
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